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Lieber's Code and the Law of War

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McGraw-Hill, 1983), which McRae cites.

This reviewer obtained a copy of *Mind Wars* from the Army's Center of Military History in Washington, DC and read it primarily for its discovery and surprise values. There were two: The first suggests a specific US military application of the psi factor to winning battles through electronics and maneuver rather than solely by attrition; the second suggests the true extent and scope of US DoD/intelligence community interest in psychic warfare, general interest inclusive and corroborative of the specifics, a consistency not made clear in *Mind Wars*.

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Hartigan, Richard Shelly. *Lieber's Code and the Law of War*. Chicago: Precedent, 1983. 157pp. \$17.95

This small volume opens with an introduction which offers a somewhat sketchy biography of Francis Lieber: as a teenage member of Blucher's army in Belgium, seriously wounded at Namur; his studies in Germany and his political difficulties with the police; his attempt to aid the Greeks in their struggle for independence; his emigration to London and then to Boston; his almost quarter of a century as a Professor at South Carolina College (now the University of South Carolina); and his ultimate success in securing the long-sought-after position at Columbia College in New York. It then continues with its real subject matter, a discussion of some of his works and of

his wartime correspondence with General Henry W. Halleck, while the latter was the "General in Chief" of the Union forces.

Just 122 years ago, on 24 April 1863, Lieber's code of land warfare, the first of its kind, was published by the Federal Government as General Orders No. 100, *Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*. As the author of the most important biography of Lieber (quoted by the author of the book under review) has correctly stated, "it was an admixture of military sternness with basic humanitarianism." It thereafter served as a source for the draftsmen of the unratified 1874 Declaration of Brussels and of the ratified 1899 and 1907 Hague Regulations. It also served to some extent as a source for the 1929 and 1949 Geneva Prisoners-of-War Conventions. Professor Hartigan has included this historic document in an appendix, making it much more easily available to the general public and to the researcher.

Although not as well known, Lieber's earlier monograph, entitled *Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War*, is also worthy of the continued interest which it has received, particularly in this era of guerrillas, partisans, national liberation armies, and just plain terrorists—all of whom claim to be legal combatants and to be entitled to prisoner-of-war treatment when they are captured, no matter for whom they fight, what their cause may be, and how they conduct the conflict in which they

engage. This study, even more difficult to find in many libraries than the *Instructions*, is also included in an appendix. Finally, there is an appendix containing some 75 pages of selected correspondence and documents from the period of the Civil War, including many letters from and to Lieber, revealing the genesis of the *Instructions*.

Anyone interested in the history of war and of the law of war will find this little volume invaluable. This reviewer has placed it on his bookshelves next to the reprint of Professor (later Judge) Baxter's article on the same subject which appeared in a 1963 issue of the *International Review of the Red Cross* (for some unknown reason, not included in the bibliography), on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the *Instructions*, an article which has long served as one of the few major sources for information concerning Lieber and his Code.

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Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., ed. *Military Modeling*. Alexandria, Va.: Military Operations Research Society, 1984. 385pp. \$17.50

This recent contribution to the literature of operations research and systems analysis is a collection of 16 papers with the following stated aims:

- to describe the attributes of well-conceived military models (and their limitations);
- to show how models can contribute to the decision process; and

- to remind the reader how models can be misused and oversold.

It will probably find more of a market in the OR/SA community than with the "notional reader . . . the military or civilian professional who has a grasp of military operations and the defense decision process" This is regrettable, but probable, because the text has none of the glossy lights and whistles nor the "dots for tots" visual aids to make it easier reading for the busy decision maker.

To this reader the "Overview" supplied by Wayne Hughes and the *caveat emptor* chapter by John Battilega and Judith Grange were most thought provoking, with Bob Hallex's review of Navy Campaign analyses a little nostalgic. Other specialists may find their pleasure in the chapters on weapon procurement (John England), logistics (Drezner and Hillestad), nuclear exchange (J.J. Martin) or air battles (John Friel). Of interest to all will be the accompanying bibliographies covering the finest work published in the field.

A model is no more than a tool used to accomplish some specific task. The more specialized the tool the easier the task and the more pleasing the result. I can probably drive a nail with a saw or wrench, but neither the effort nor the result is satisfying. The cost effectiveness zealot could be convinced he only needs the one multipurpose hammer whether driving tacks, spikes or fenceposts, but he will suffer exhaustion and frustration for his